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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WITHOUT SHAREHOLDERS: A
CAUTIONARY LESSON FROM NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
BY GEORGE W. DENT, JR.*
ABSTRACT
A debate about corporate governance has long raged over the
allocation of power between shareholders and directors. Proponents of
"shareholder primacy" believe that the corporate board should be chosen
by and accountable to the stockholders rather than dominated by the CEO,
as they believe is common now. Advocates of "director primacy" want to
limit shareholder power because they believe that shareholders have
conflicting objectives, are uninformed, and pressure the directors to
sacrifice the long-term health of the company to short-term share price.
The governance of non-profit organizations ("NPOs") offers an
example that illuminates the corporate governance debate. Directors of NPOs
suffer no pressure from shareholders because NPOs have no shareholders;
NPO boards are effectively self-perpetuating. If the director primacists are
correct, the governance of NPOs should be a model of wise, long-term
management effected by officers who are clearly subordinate to the board.
In fact, however, a remarkable consensus of experts on NPOs agrees
that their governance is generally abysmal, considerably worse than that of
for-profit corporations. NPO directors are mostly ill-informed, quarrelsome,
clueless about their proper role, and dominated by the CEO—as proponents
of shareholder primacy would predict. In sum, the experience of NPO
governance refutes the claims of director primacy that the absence of strong
shareholders facilitates effective corporate governance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For over eighty years, debate over corporate governance has centered
on the balance of authority between boards and shareholders.1 One side of
this debate advocates "shareholder primacy" so that directors would actually
be chosen by and would be accountable to the stockholders rather than
bowing to the CEO as, they believe, often happens now.2 The other side
touts "director primacy" and keeping shareholders weak because
shareholders are uninformed, have conflicting preferences, and focus
obsessively on short-term results.3 Further, this side claims that directors
who are free of shareholder control would strive to maximize long-term firm
value and have the wisdom and independence to pursue this goal
intelligently and conscientiously.4
If this director primacy vision is accurate, non-profit organizations
("NPOs") should offer an attractive model for corporate governance.5
Directors of NPOs are not answerable to shareholders because they have no
shareholders; NPO boards are legally self-perpetuating.6 Suffering no
baleful shareholder pressure for short-term results, these boards are free to
create and implement strategies for the prudent, long-term development of
their organizations.7 If the director primacists are right, NPO boards should
function in the way that director primacists wish that corporate boards would
function.8
The reality is quite the contrary. A remarkable number of
commentators agree that boards of NPOs are generally even less effective
than corporate boards.9 Moreover, NPO boards tend to be dominated by the
organization's executives, just as advocates of shareholder primacy claim
happens when shareholders are too weak to hold corporate directors
accountable.10 The example of NPOs offers a cautionary tale that boards

1

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part I.
3
See infra Part I.
4
See infra Part I.
5
See infra Part II.
6
See infra Part III.
7
See infra Part II.
8
See infra Part III.
9
See infra Part II.
10
Id.; see also Paul L. Davies, The Board of Directors: Composition, Structure, Duties and
Powers, OECD 6 (Dec. 7-8, 2000), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinc
iples/1857291.pdf (pointing out that in the absence of strong shareholders, boards are likely to be
"captured" by management, and become "expressions" of their unaccountability to shareholders).
2
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unconstrained by strong shareholders do not make for efficient
organizations.11
Part I of this Article briefly describes the corporate governance debate
between the director primacy and shareholder primacy factions.12 Part II
describes the functioning of boards of directors of NPOs.13 Part III discusses
the significance of this example for the corporate governance debate.14
II. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBATE: DIRECTOR PRIMACY VS.
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
Supporters of shareholder primacy see shareholders as entitled to the
residual income of the corporation; they get all (and only) the income left
after all other constituents (including employees, suppliers, creditors, and tax
authorities) have been paid in full according to their legal claims.15 Thus
shareholders "have the greatest incentive to maximize the value of the
firm."16 Accordingly, the board of directors' objective should be to serve the
interests of the shareholders by maximizing the value of the stock.17
Corporate governance rules should be designed to serve this principle.18
Advocates of director primacy raise several objections to shareholder
primacy.19 They claim that different shareholders have different goals;
shareholders are short-term oriented, ignoring the long-term welfare of the

11

See infra Part III.
See infra Part I.
13
See infra Part II.
14
See infra Part III.
15
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 67 (1991) ("[S]hareholders are the residual claimants to the firm's income.
Creditors have fixed claims, and employees generally negotiate compensations schedules in advance
of performance. The gains and losses from abnormally good or bad performance are the lot of the
shareholders, whose claims stand last in line.").
16
Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder
Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1267-68 (1999);
see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 68 ("As the residual claimants, shareholders
have the appropriate incentives . . . to make discretionary decisions.").
17
Macey, supra note 16, at 1267-68 ("[C]orporations [and their directors] should maximize
value for shareholders and shareholders alone because shareholders, as residual claimants, have the
greatest incentive to maximize the value of the firm.").
18
See George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix in Sight, 31 J. CORP.
L. 39, 51, 69-70, 76 (discussing how corporate governance rules should be designed to maximize the
value of stock for shareholders).
19
See infra text accompanying notes 20-22 (discussing the objections to shareholder primacy
by advocates for director primacy).
12
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corporation and even of the equity; and shareholders are ill informed.20 They
believe that shareholder power should not be enhanced and, indeed, that
shareholders are already too powerful.21 Shareholders should have little
control over the board so that directors are free to act as "Platonic
guardians."22 Indeed, like Ulysses, shareholders of public corporations
traditionally tied their own hands, ceding control to an independent board, in
order to preclude the damage that shareholders would inflict on themselves if
they exercised control.23
The governance of NPOs offers a lesson for the governance of forprofit corporations.24 Boards of directors of NPOs are not accountable to
shareholders because they have no shareholders;25 they face no constraints to
acting as "Platonic guardians."26 If director primacy theorists are correct, this
governance structure should result in intelligent, prudent, cooperative, farsighted management.27 If shareholder primacists are correct, the NPO
boards' lack of accountability should result in laxity, confusion about goals,
personality conflicts, and domination of boards by NPO executives,
especially the CEO.28 Who is right?

20

LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 69-70 (2012); George W. Dent, Jr., The
Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97,
100-05 (2010); Lawrence Mitchell, Protect Industry from Speculators, FIN. TIMES, July 8, 2009,
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fac881b6-6be5-11de-9320-00144feabdc0.html.
21
Dent, supra note 20, at 147 ("[S]ome commentators feel that shareholders have become
too powerful and their rights should be curtailed. Delaware's Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, for
example, wants to deny voting rights altogether to stockholders who have held their shares for less
than a year or who seek control.").
22
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550-51 (2003). Similarly, Lynn Stout says (with nostalgia)
that "for most of the twentieth century directors of public companies who did not breach their loyalty
duties enjoyed virtually unfettered discretion to set corporate policy . . . ." STOUT, supra note 20, at
110; see also George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director
Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1216-40 (2008) (discussing in
detail why shareholders should have little control over the board).
23
See STOUT, supra note 20, at 74-83.
24
See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
25
Seong J. Kim, Hiding Behind the Corporate Veil: A Guide For Non-Profit Corporations
With For-Profit Subsidiaries, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 189, 205 (2009).
26
See Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 605. This is in contrast to board of directors of forprofit corporations, according to the director primacy model. See id.
27
See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
28
See supra Part I.
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III. BOARDS OF DIRECTORS OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
Like business corporations, most NPOs are governed by a board of
directors.29 "Boards are charged with setting the organization's agenda and
priorities . . . ."30 Unlike business corporations, however, the boards of
NPOs are not elected by shareholders because NPOs have no shareholders.31
The charter may vest in the NPO's members or some other group authority to
elect the board of directors periodically, but this is rarely done; most boards
are self-perpetuating.32
In theory, then, NPO boards are accountable to no one so long as they
obey the law.33 Indeed, because they are fiduciaries, they cannot delegate or
contract away their authority to anyone else.34 NPO employees, including the
CEO, are by law always subject to the superior power of the board; their
authority can be reduced or completely withdrawn by the board at any time
for any reason sufficient to the board.35
Clothed with authority not limited or accountable to anyone except to
the law, NPO boards are free of the pressures that director primacists allege
plague directors of business corporations; namely to produce short-term

29
Most NPOs are organized as non-profit corporations (NPCs) under state statutes that
typically state that, unless otherwise provided, an NPC is to be managed by or under the direction of
a board of directors. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1702.30(A) (West 2012) ("Except where
the law, the articles [of incorporation], or the regulations require that action be otherwise authorized
or taken, all of the authority of a corporation shall be exercised by or under the direction of its
directors."). Some NPOs are organized as trusts, the governance of which is similar except that the
governing body is then a trustee or board of trustees. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH,
GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 133, 13847 (2004).
30
RICHARD P. CHAIT, WILLIAM P. RYAN & BARBARA E. TAYLOR, GOVERNANCE AS
LEADERSHIP: REFRAMING THE WORK OF NONPROFIT BOARDS 3 (2005).
31
See Kim, supra note 25, at 205.
32
A non-profit corporation may have members. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.26
(West 2004); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 29, at 159. However, "[t]he majority of charitable
corporations are governed by a self-perpetuating board of directors, often called trustees." Id.; see
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.14 (West 2004); BRUCE R. HOPKINS, STARTING AND MANAGING A
NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION: A LEGAL GUIDE 14-20 (5th ed. 2005) (stating that it is a common
practice for an organization to have a self-perpetuating board that elects officers).
33
NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 3-4 (Cheryl Sorokin et al. eds., Am. Bar
Ass'n 3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE].
34
Id. at 8-9.
35
The board may commit to a contract to pay someone compensation for a term, but the
board remains free to remove the person from office. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1702.34(B)(2) (West 2004) ("Any officer may be removed, with or without cause, by the persons
authorized to elect or appoint the officer without prejudice to the contract rights of such officer.").
Even if they wish to do so, boards "may not . . . abdicate their duty to direct . . . ." FREMONTSMITH, supra note 29, at 162.
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results at the expense of the long-term effectiveness of the organization.36
An NPO board can choose the organization's objectives and set as distant a
horizon as it wishes for the accomplishment of those objectives.37 NPOs
must report certain data annually to maintain their tax-exempt status, and
these reports are available to the public.38 However, NPOs need not, and
typically do not, disclose quarterly results or project future short-term
results.39 Even informal public pressure for short-term results is extremely
rare.40 No one can threaten to oust NPO directors; so long as they obey the
law, they need only satisfy themselves.41
Under the theory of director primacy that pressure from short-termist
shareholders wreaks havoc with long-term corporate planning, NPO boards
(which are free of that pressure) should be models of prudent, far-sighted
leadership.42 However, according to a virtually unanimous consensus of
experts, this is not the case at all. NPO directors are generally uninformed
and disengaged.43 "[B]oard members . . . are faulted for not knowing what is
going on in their organizations and for not demonstrating much desire to find

36

Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 550-51; see supra notes 22-23, 29.
See NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE, supra note 33, at 5-6.
38
JOHN TROPMAN & THOMAS J. HARVEY, NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: THE WHY, WHAT,
AND HOW OF NONPROFIT BOARDSHIP 241-42 (2009).
39
See Debra Askanase, The Non-Profit Quarterly Report = Transparency, COMMUNITY
ORGANIZER 2.0 (Dec. 30, 2008), http://communityorganizer20.com/2008/12/30/the-non-profitquarterly-report-transparency/ (explaining the risks of releasing non-profit quarterly reports while
indicating that such reports may help foster transparency).
40
See Marc J. Epstein & F. Warren McFarlan, Nonprofit vs. For-Profit Boards: Critical
Differences, STRATEGIC FIN. MAG., March 2011, at 28, 32-33 (explaining that the financial and
performance metrics that create a strong focus on short-term performance in the for-profit world are
not present in the non-profit world).
41
Leslie Rosenthal, Nonprofit Corporate Governance: The Board's Role, THE HARVARD
LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (Apr. 15, 2012), https://blogs
.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/04/15/nonprofit-corporate-governance-the-boards-role/ ("Unless
board members are doing something illegal or are term-limited out of office, they may serve in
perpetuity, giving them ultimate power over the organization. In this regard, nonprofit trusteeship is
a unique and privileged role."); see also TROPMAN & HARVEY, supra note 38, at 31-32 (stating that
non-profit boards have performed poorly because they are insulated from accountability and
responsibility, and because no one fires a board member).
42
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1646 (2013) ("During the 1980s, prominent business school academics and
business thought leaders argued that short-termism was an important driver of the United States'
dismal performance during that period."); TROPMAN & HARVEY, supra note 38, at 26 (stating that
stockholders are a dominant force in for-profits, whereas they are absent in the case of non-profits);
SHARON M. OSTER, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY AND
CASES 77 (1995) ("[T]here are no stockholders in the nonprofit . . . . Thus, the usual role of the
board as a protector of stockholder rights over the interests of management is absent in the
nonprofit.").
43
CHAIT ET AL., supra note 30, at 20.
37
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out. Attendance at board meetings is often spotty and participation
perfunctory."44
The insignificance of the directors is even touted as a benefit of the
job.45 "[S]ome boards actually encourage the disengagement they later
lament: They promise prospective board members that there will be little
work to do, in the hope that low expectations will attract more prospective
board members."46 And:
It is not uncommon to elect individuals to serve as directors
because of certain unique contributions they are able to
make. . . . In many instances it is understood that these
individuals will not be expected to attend meetings or give the
affairs of the charity the degree of attention expected of other
board members.47
One reason for the directors' passivity is that "they do not know what their
job is."48 "[B]oard members often have no idea what they are to do
individually and collectively."49 "A central finding of the empirical literature
on non-profit boards is that board members are uncertain both of their roles
and those of their senior managers."50 The NPO directors' lack of
accountability leads not to wise governance but to confusion.
Dysfunction is not limited to a minority of NPO boards: "Frustration
with boards is so chronic and widespread that board and troubled board
have become almost interchangeable."51 Criticism of NPO boards is not
limited to just a few gadflies; it seems to be shared by everyone

44

Id. at 13; see also TROPMAN & HARVEY, supra note 38, at 32 ("[Nonprofit] boards do not
care about management in the largest, most positive sense . . . .").
45
Rosenthal, supra note 41 (stating that a frequent error made by non-profit boards is
inviting new members because of their wealth or marquee name without due consideration to the
person's ability and availability to fulfill fiduciary duties).
46
CHAIT ET AL., supra note 30, at 13.
47
FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 29, at 433 (showing that it is often understood that directors
will be disengaged).
48
CHAIT ET AL., supra note 30, at 14.
49
TROPMAN & HARVEY, supra note 38, at 32.
50
THE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC AND NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS 151 (Chris Cornforth.
ed., 2003) [hereinafter GOVERNANCE OF NPOS]; see also CHAIT ET AL., supra note 30, at 92 ("Most
boards are on the outside looking in, as virtually everyone else in and around the organization
participates in generative work.").
51
CHAIT ET AL., supra note 30, at 11; see also Robert D. Herman & David O. Renz, Board
Practices of Especially Effective and Less Effective Local Nonprofit Organizations, 30 AM. REV.
PUB. ADMIN. 146, 148 (2000) ("experience and research suggest that many boards fail to meet fully
their prescribed responsibilities”).
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knowledgeable about NPO governance. While conducting research, the
authors of one volume on non-profit boards "came across one universally
agreed upon point: Boards of directors are deeply flawed. They seriously
underperform and malperform virtually everywhere."52
It is not surprising, then, that most non-profit boards do not actually
govern.53 CEOs actually run most NPOs; most boards merely rubber-stamp
the CEO's plans.54 "[M]any nonprofit executives are not only leading their
organizations, but . . . they are actually governing them as well."55 Rather
than telling the CEO what to do, boards do what the CEO tells them:
"Instead of identifying problems, framing issues, or making sense of the
organization, most boards address the problems that managers present to
them."56 Indeed, although in theory the board is self-perpetuating and
controls the CEO, in practice, the CEO picks the board as much as the board
picks the CEO.57
CEOs are very happy with this state of affairs.58 CEOs typically
communicate with just a few key directors and leave the others ignorant.59
"[W]hen a nonprofit executive says, 'I have a really good board,' savvy
listeners know this often means 'I have a compliant board.'"60
Ironically, despite the passivity of non-profit boards and the
widespread understanding that the job requires little effort, non-profit boards
are often fractious.61 "[T]he nonprofit board [has] more dissension on

52

TROPMAN & HARVEY, supra note 38, at 31; see also Herman & Renz, supra note 51, at
147 ("Some believe that "nonprofit boards are largely irrelevant anachronisms . . . .").
53
Jan Masaoka & Mike Allison, Why Boards Don't Govern, COMPASSPOINT NONPROFIT
SERVICES, http://www.maconsulting.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/why-boards-dont-govern
.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
54
See id. (stating that CEOs normally possess much more knowledge about a specific field
than board members).
55
CHAIT ET AL., supra note 30, at 3; see also Evelyn Brody, The Board of Nonprofit
Organizations: Puzzling Through the Gaps Between Law and Practice, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 521,
526 (2007) ("Board members sometimes feel beholden to the person or group that that
recommended, nominated, or elected them to the board. Indeed, it is not uncommon . . . that the
board as a whole defers excessively to the chief executive officer [] for this very reason.").
56
CHAIT ET AL., supra note 30, at 92.
57
See Robert D. Herman & F. Peter Tulipana, Board-Staff Relations And Perceived
Effectiveness in Nonprofit Organizations, in NONPROFIT BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: ANALYSES AND
APPLICATIONS 48, 58 (Robert D. Herman & Jon Van Til eds., 1989).
58
CHAIT ET AL., supra note 30, at 11.
59
Terry W. McAdam & David L. Gies, Managing Expectations: What Effective Board
Members Ought to Expect From Nonprofit Organizations, in NONPROFIT BOARDS OF DIRECTORS:
ANALYSES AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 57, at 79.
60
CHAIT ET AL., supra note 30, at 11.
61
See id. at 12-13.
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average than the for-profit . . . ."62 Since the directors do not really direct,
they tend to descend into personal squabbling. "Their processes and
meetings become a venue for expressing and implementing private
agendas."63 Thus, although NPO boards are self-perpetuating and not
answerable to shareholders, they still are not unified, harmonious, or
cooperative.64
Although in theory all directors have equal power, non-profit boards
"are typically 'run' by the most socially 'powerful' person on the board."65
Choosing the leader on the basis of social standing does not lead to effective
governance. "Even the best ones fail in many areas and the worst ones are
abysmal."66
In sum, "[t]here is a widespread view that nonprofit organizations are
generally less well managed than businesses."67 Even critics of directors of
business corporations share this view. "While for-profit boards have much
to answer for, and have been poor performers in many cases, nonprofit
boards are, amazingly, worse."68 I have found no one who claims that the
governance of NPOs is generally superior to that of for-profit corporations.
IV. LESSONS FROM NON-PROFIT BOARDS
Director primacy theory posits that shareholder control is deleterious
because shareholders are uninformed and short-term oriented, and different
shareholders have different goals.69 The experience of NPOs shows that
director primacy produces no benefits in these respects.70 Directors of NPOs
are not well informed; they do not even know what they are supposed to do.71
They are not far-sighted.72 They lack a vision of the goals of the
organization and tend to defer to the CEO in planning.73 Neither are they

62

OSTER, supra note 42, at 76.
TROPMAN & HARVEY, supra note 38, at 32.
64
See id. at 31-32.
65
Id. at 32; see also id. ("Status and hierarchy operating as they typically do, other members
defer to the socially prominent.").
66
Id. at 32.
67
Robert D. Herman, Board Functions and Board-Staff Relations in Nonprofit
Organizations: An Introduction, in NONPROFIT BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: ANALYSES AND
APPLICATION, supra note 57, at 1.
68
TROPMAN & HARVEY, supra note 38, at 31.
69
See Dent, supra note 20, at 100-04 (illustrating the allegedly different goals of
shareholders).
70
See supra Part II.
71
See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
72
See supra Part II.
73
See supra notes 60, 63-65 and accompanying text.
63
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unified nor even cooperative.74 Many NPO boards are either riven by
conflict or dominated by a couple of members who leave other directors in
the dark and powerless.75
Why are NPO boards so passive, and is this a problem? To some
extent board passivity and CEO dominance are inherent to and desirable for
organizations, whether for-profit or non-profit.76 No one believes that the
board of either a corporation or a NPO should design the organization's
strategy, much less manage its operations.77 As a full-time manager with a
full-time staff, the CEO (for-profit or non-profit) has much better
information than the directors, who meet only a few times per year and who
usually have no separate staff and, therefore, depend on the CEO for their
information.78 It is obviously difficult for directors to monitor the CEO's
performance or to question her plans when they have only the information
that the CEO deigns to give them.79 The board hires the CEO to manage the
organization; so long as it retains confidence in the CEO, it makes sense that
the board would give heavy weight to the CEO's views.80
However, autocratic rule is undesirable because no one is omniscient
and the personal interests of the CEO never coincide exactly with the
interests of the organization.81 Boards should provide the greater wisdom of
group deliberation and curb the CEO's natural human tendency (often
subconscious) to elevate her own interests over those of the organization.
NPO boards could do this, but generally do not.
Director primacists charge that excessive shareholder influence trashes
prudent long-term planning in favor of short-term gimmicks.82 However, the

74

See CHAIT ET AL., supra note 30, at 12.
See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
76
See CHAIT ET AL., supra note 30, at 92; Robert F. Hoel, Boards and CEOs: Who's Really
in Charge?, FILENE RESEARCH INST. 1, 4 (2011), http://filene.org/assets/pdf-reports/254_Hoel_
Board_CEO.pdf.
77
See OSTER, supra note 42, at 76; The Basics of Corporate Structure, INVESTOPEDIA
(Dec. 07, 2013), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/03/022803.asp (stating that the board's
role is to monitor a corporation's managers, including the CEO, who is responsible for company
operations).
78
See Robert F. Leduc & Stephen R. Block, Conjoint Directorship: Clarifying Management
Roles Between the Board of Directors and the Executive Director, in NONPROFIT BOARDS OF
DIRECTORS: ANALYSES AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 57, at 67, 71 (stating that non-profit boards
get their information from the organization's "disseminator" who has large discretion to "tell the
story" as he or she sees it).
79
Id. at 72 ("Intentionally or unintentionally, the executive director can influence the policy
decision capability of the board by either stressing or withholding certain information.").
80
See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68-69 (1974) (explaining the
need for centralized decision-making in large organizations).
81
Id. at 27.
82
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
75
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record of NPOs demonstrates that the absence of shareholders makes matters
worse, not better: "The planning horizon for an NPO is relatively short,
while it is longer for a profit corporation."83
Experts advise measures that NPO boards could take in order to be
more effective.84 Many of these measures are also recommended for boards
of businesses.85 However, in NPOs, institution of reforms depends entirely
on the volition of the directors; there is no external force to compel or even
agitate for their adoption.86 Perhaps more importantly, no model blueprint
for a board (NPO or for-profit) will do much good unless the directors
choose the right goals and work diligently to achieve them, and continue to
do so forever.87 Even when reforms are enthusiastically pursued for a while,
the human tendency to take the easy path usually prevails eventually and the
initial zeal dissipates unless there is some incentive to maintain discipline.88
Why, then, are NPO boards generally even less effective than forprofit boards? How do their incentives differ? One possibility is that
directors of for-profit companies are compensated while directors of NPOs
usually are not.89 This explanation, too, seems unlikely. Most outside
directors of businesses are highly-paid executives.90 Their director
compensation does not substantially alter their wealth. Boards of NPOs

83

ROBERT D. HAY, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: AN
ADMINISTRATOR'S HANDBOOK 153 (1990).
84
See generally CHAIT ET AL., supra note 30.
85
See, e.g., TROPMAN & HARVEY, supra note 38, at 7-9 (recommending promotion of the
functioning of the board as a "group" and carefully planned divisions of authority); see also DENNIS
D. POINTER & JAMES E. ORLIKOFF, THE HIGH-PERFORMANCE BOARD: PRINCIPLES OF NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATION GOVERNANCE 23-79 (2002) (recommending, inter alia, a clear definition of
organizational goals and standards for review of executive performance).
86
See TROPMAN & HARVEY, supra note 38, at 55-56 (NPO boards are responsible for
articulating the broad vision, long-term mission, and specific plans for their organizations).
87
See id. at 39-54 (discussing responsibilities of boards, such as reassessment of strategic
goals, annual audit of fiscal performance, closer oversight of the CEO, recruitment planning, and
establishing a community representative system).
88
An instructive example is the experience of monasteries in the Middle Ages. A monastery
was always founded "to be a little oasis of sanctity." FRIEDRICH HEER, THE MEDIEVAL WORLD:
EUROPE 1100-1350, at 41 (Janet Sondheimer trans., World Publ'g Co. 1962) (1961). However,
"[w]ith monotonous regularity after two or three generations monastic discipline would start to
decline. . . . There were thus any number of monastic reforms, all with the same object, to restore
the monasteries to their proper functions, the performance of their specific duties." Id.
89
See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 29, at 168 (stating that members of boards of charitable
corporations generally serve without compensation). Some commentators recommend that NPO
directors be paid, but this recommendation is rarely followed. Should Board Members
of Nonprofit Organizations Be Compensated?, AM. SOC'Y OF ASS'N EXECS. (Nov. 2006), http:/
/www.asaecenter.org/Resources/whitepaperdetail.cfm?ItemNumber=22981.
90
ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 260 (1995) ("[T]he
most popular type of director is a top executive of another company.").
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meet almost as often as for-profit boards, which suggests that the members
of both devote similar amounts of time to their positions.91
More importantly, any explanation based on director compensation
would require a showing of how compensation motivates for-profit directors
and would motivate non-profit directors if they were paid.92 It seems
unlikely that gratitude for one's fee would by itself substantially change the
behavior of NPO directors.93 If anything, compensation with no strings
attached would probably attract candidates for the board who have little
interest in the mission of the organization and only wanted the money.94 If
for-profit boards are more effective, it presumably is because of some
exogenous force that can continue or withdraw the benefits of the position.95
A second possibility is that under the law directors of businesses owe
legally enforceable fiduciary duties to the corporation.96 However, legal
accountability of corporate boards (except for self-dealing) is almost nonexistent, so fiduciary duties create very little incentive for corporate directors
to strain to enhance share value.97 The vulnerability of NPO directors to

91
The typical board of a major NPO holds a meeting about seven times per year. See
Adrianne DuMond, National Nonprofit Board Statistics, MANAGING NONPROFITS, www.mana
gingnonprofits.org/2013/02/12/national-nonprofit-board-statistics/; see also MONKS & MINOW,
supra note 90, at 261 ("The typical [for-profit] board meets less than eight times annually.").
92
See Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming
Obedience Into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 906 (2007) ("[M]arket mechanisms that
encourage attention to profit making help [for-profit] directors . . . stay focused on the appropriate
goals. . . . There is no market to keep the focus of [non-profit directors] on a particular goal.").
93
See id. at 906-07 ("Performance-based compensation, while familiar in the charitable
sector, is not directly related to anything as concrete as financial-statement profitability or stock
price, so its incentive effect is less direct than for business executives.").
94
See id. at 907 ("There is no clear force that drives nonprofit directors . . . to achieve the
good results for which their organizations exist; they must be self-motivated to an extent not
expected of individuals in business organizations who are impelled by both fear and greed from
external forces.").
95
See id. ("Even individuals who feel a strong personal commitment may not be as
motivated by that commitment as individuals stimulated by the external forces that encourage forprofit managers.").
96
See Sugin, supra note 92, at 897 ("The directors of all corporations owe fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty to those corporations.").
97
See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 126 (Francis A. Allen et al. eds., 2nd
prtg. 1986) ("[T]he total number of reported cases in which derivative actions against directors of
nonfinancial corporations were actually won on the merits on the basis of simple negligence
uncomplicated by any fraud or self-dealing is small. . . . [T]he case law experience must still lead us
to wonder whether the courts are serious when they say directors may be held liable for
negligence."); see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 242
(2002) ("[T]he duty of care tells directors to exercise reasonable care in making corporate decisions .
. . [but] the business judgment rule says that courts must defer to the board of directors' judgment
absent highly unusual expectations.").
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individual liability is minimal,98 too, but it is probably no weaker than the
legal accountability of for-profit boards.99 Although directors of NPOs are
not subject to suit by shareholders, they can be sued by state attorneys
general.100
A third possibility is that directors of a business corporation are
usually also stockholders of the corporation and therefore have a personal
monetary interest in its performance that directors of NPOs (which have no
stockholders) do not have.101 Most outside corporate directors (who are the
majority of the board of most public companies) hold few shares in the
company, so this financial interest creates little incentive for them to work
hard to increase the share price.102 This situation could be changed by giving
outside directors a larger equity stake.103 However, this would make their
positions so valuable that they, like the officers, would want to retain those
positions, even at the expense of share value.104 Rather than overseeing

98

See HOPKINS, supra note 32, at 315-19 (listing grounds on which NPO directors can
avoid personally liable).
99
See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 29, at 200 (stating that most courts have imposed the
same standards of care and loyalty on NPO directors as on for-profit directors); see also Stern v.
Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1014
(D.D.C. 1974) ("A director [of a non-profit corporation] whose failure to supervise permits
negligent mismanagement by other to go unchecked has committed an independent wrong against
the corporation . . . ." (citations omitted)).
100
See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 29, at 305-09 (describing the powers of state attorney
general with respect to NPOs).
101
Consistent with statutes authorizing bylaws that require share ownership as a
qualification to serve as a director, many public corporations have adopted share ownership
guidelines for their directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2010) ("Directors need
not be stockholders unless so required by the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws."); see also In
re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 366 (Del. Ch. 2008) ("[A] director who is also a
shareholder of his corporation is more likely to have interests that are aligned with the other
shareholders of that corporation as it is in his best interest, as a shareholder, to negotiate a
transaction that will result in the largest return for all shareholders." (quoting Orman v. Cullman, 794
A.2d 5, 26 n.56 (Del. Ch. 2002))).
102
"[A]ll too often, outside directors hold [in company stock], at best, only small proportions
of their net worth, and merely token holdings at worst." MONKS & MINOW, supra note 90, at 262.
Director compensation has tended to be "management largesse," which compromised director
independence from management. See Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the
Management-Captured Board—The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 132
(1996).
103
See Elson, supra note 102, at 133-34 (emphasizing the benefits of paying outside
directors in large amounts of company stock, thus making the directors substantial shareholders who
now have a personal interest in the company's profitability and productivity).
104
See Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 792
(2011) ("If the board is supposed to be a truly independent, distant monitor, then giving directors
personal ties to the firm's finances might make them too much like the managers they are supposed
to monitor.").
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management for the benefit of the shareholders, then, the board would align
with management to entrench both.105
Nonetheless, even a small equity stake does give outside directors of
business corporations an incentive that directors of NPOs lack.106 However,
this incentive is possible only because the for-profit corporation has
stockholders and most of them are not directors.107 If the directors own a
majority of the stock, they will serve their own interests rather than those of
the outside, minority owners.108
Thus, the main reason for the differences in the performance of forprofit and non-profit boards is that shareholders elect the former while the
latter are self-perpetuating.109 The importance of shareholder election of
corporate boards should not be exaggerated. Proxy fights in board elections
are extremely rare.110 Absent a proxy fight, the board's self-selected slate of
nominees runs unopposed.111
As an alternative to a proxy fight, stockholders can sell a majority of a
company's shares in a tender offer by a bidder who can then elect its own
nominees to replace the incumbent directors.112 If the incumbent board has
allowed the company's stock price to fall below what it would be under
competent management, a tender offer becomes economically appealing

105

Cf. Elson, supra note 102, at 133 (explaining the need for outside directors to align their
interests with those of the shareholder in order to "stimulate real oversight").
106
See Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U.
CIN. L. REV. 649, 691 (1995) ("By becoming equity holders, the outside directors would assume a
personal stake in the success or failure of the enterprise.").
107
See id. at 690 n.87 ("[Y]ou can not abandon emphasis on 'the view that business
corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders' . . . ." (quoting A.A.
Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367
(1932)).
108
See Elson, supra note 106, at 691 (analogizing outside directors becoming substantial
shareholders with an individual being responsible for looking over the individual's own property to
demonstrate that, in both situations, the individual has a personal interest that will lead to more
vigilant care).
109
See Joshua B. Nix, The Things People Do When No One Is Looking: An Argument for
the Expansion of Standing in the Charitable Sector, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 147, 158-59 (2005)
(discussing some differences between for-profit boards of directors and non-profit boards of
directors).
110
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business
Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557, 559 (2005).
111
See id. at 560 (describing the possibility that proxy fights may not be initiated because the
shareholders are satisfied with the board or, even if the shareholders are not satisfied, because of the
consequent "cost and impediments").
112
See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 13-14 (2nd ed. 2007) (stating
that tender offers were historically used in place of proxy contests as a quicker means to replace
inefficient management and that the Securities Exchange Commission has since regulated the
practice).
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since the bidder can pay the existing shareholders more than the current
price of the stock but less than its optimal value; both sides win.113 However,
there are many obstacles to takeovers by tender offer so that most
underperforming boards avoid them.114
Many public companies have now adopted majority voting so that a
director might be ousted if holders of a majority of the shares simply decline
to vote for her.115 However, to date, the prospects of removal from the board
in such cases have been more theoretical than actual; most directors who
have failed to obtain a majority vote remain in their positions.116
Nonetheless, shareholder rights create at least some incentive for
corporate boards.117 Although proxy fights in board elections and hostile

113

This phenomenon was first described by Henry Manne. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers
and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 120 (1965) (explaining that empirical
evidence may not capture a company's true take-over motivation—to cure a poorly-run company of
its inefficient management). There is considerable (though not unanimous) empirical support for the
theory that hostile takeovers tend to displace underperforming managements. See, e.g., Eugene P.H.
Furtado & Vijay Karan, Causes, Consequences, and Shareholder Wealth Effects of Management
Turnover: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, 19 FIN. MGMT. 60, 61, 65 (1990) (stating that weak
firm performance increases the probability of a change in top management and that other researchers
have found poor firm performance to be associated with turnover); see also Kenneth J. Martin &
John J. McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover, 46
J. FIN. 671, 683 (1991) (finding hostile takeover targets are poor performers within their industries);
Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and
Friendly Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 101, 115, 117,
120-23, 124 (Alan J. Auerbach, ed., 1988) (finding hostile targets have fewer assets, lower market
values, heavier debts, and incompetent management, which make them prime targets for takeover).
But cf. Anup Agrawal & Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Do Takeover Targets Underperform? Evidence from
Operating and Stock Returns, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 721, 743-44 (2003) (finding
insignificant to no evidence to support the hypothesis that takeover targets were previously poor
performers).
114
See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 7.3.1, at 704-10 (2d ed. 2010)
(describing a variety of takeover defenses that a board can adopt to prevent hostile takeovers, some
of which include amending the articles and bylaws, communicating with shareholders, repurchasing
the company's stock, issuing more stock, suing the hostile buyer, and seeking out a "white knight").
115
See Denise F. Brown, Updated Study Shows Majority Voting Being Adopted at
"Breathtaking Speed," 5 CARE 190 (2007) (stating that many boards have adopted majority voting
policies that directly affect mandatory, board-member resignations).
116
See James B. Stewart, Why Bad Directors Aren't Thrown Out, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/30/business/why-bad-directors-arent-thrown-out.html?hp
&_r=0 ("Last year, there were elections for 17,081 director nominees at United States corporations,
according to [Institutional Shareholder Services]. Only 61 of those nominees, or 0.36 percent, failed
to get majority support. More than 86 percent of directors received 90 percent or more of the votes.
Of the 61 directors who failed to get majority approval, only six actually stepped down or were
asked to resign. Fifty-one are still in place, as of the most recent proxy filings.").
117
See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1255, 1300 (2008) (stating three general ways shareholders exert their influence on
corporations).
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tender offers are both rare, they do happen occasionally.118 Partial proxy
fights are becoming more common.119 An activist investor that acquires a
substantial block of stock and suggests changes that other investors are likely
to support can make a credible threat to mount a proxy fight for board seats
or to attract a takeover bidder.120 Facing a serious effort to oust them because
they have allegedly disregarded shareholder interests is embarrassing to
directors even if they ultimately prevail; to lose would be even more
ignominious.121
Short of a proxy fight or a tender offer, an investor can threaten to
submit a policy resolution for a shareholder vote.122 Such resolutions often
fail, and even when approved they are usually not binding on the board.123
Nonetheless, even an unsuccessful insurgency generates publicity that
criticizes management.124 High-paid full-time executives may accept this
criticism and the effort of resisting the campaign as the price of maintaining
their authority and perquisites, but the outside directors (the majority of most
boards) often respond differently.125 Even for shareholder resolutions
addressing the powers of the board the real target is usually management.126

118

See Bebchuk, supra note 110, at 559 (finding only 215 proxy fights occurred in the six
year period studied).
119
See Steven M. Davidoff, Revisiting the Proxy Contest, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2009),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/revisiting-the-proxy-contest/?_r=0& pagewanted=print.
120
See Morgan N. Neuwirth, Shareholder Franchise—No Compromise: Why the Delaware
Courts Must Proscribe All Managerial Interference with Corporate Voting, 145 U. PA. L. REV.
423, 432-35 (1996) (describing the role that institutional investors play in board challenges).
121
See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 117, at 1300.
122
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2013) (describing the process a shareholder must follow to
have a proposal included on the company's proxy card).
123
In Delaware, where most large public companies are incorporated, the shareholders
cannot amend the corporate charter without the board's cooperation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
242(b) (2011) (requiring a board resolution before shareholder approval to amend the charter). The
Model Business Corporation Act, which is followed in many other states, is the same. See MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03(a) (2010). In most states, shareholders alone can amend bylaws, but the
charters of many public companies require a supermajority vote for this purpose, and a shareholderadopted provision may not bind the board. George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance: The
Swedish Solution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1633, 1665-66 (2012).
124
See Andrew R. Brownstein & Igor Kirman, Can A Board Say No When Shareholders
Say Yes? Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions, 60 BUS. LAW. 23, 46-47 (2004) (discussing the
implications of shareholders withholding votes in a board election).
125
See Dent, supra note 18, at 40 (observing that corporate executives are determined to
maintain their privileges in the face of corporate governance reform).
126
For example, resolutions concerning antitakeover provisions or executive compensation
usually deal with board powers, but their ultimate purpose is to loosen the entrenchment of the
managers or to curb their compensation. See Adjusting to Shareholder Activism, SULLIVAN &
CROMWELL LLP 1-2 (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.sullcrom.com/files/Publication/533e7c3d-bd9346b6-af66-7f61424f962f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9df56a6e-6e36-4d4b-8856-81a5c95
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The outside directors may not feel much of a personal stake in these battles;
they may be unwilling to wage a public campaign against the shareholders
just to preserve the privileges of the managers.127 As a result, shareholders
often do exert some influence over corporate boards.128
Non-profit organizations, however, have no shareholders who can
wage a proxy fight to oust directors, to adopt policy resolutions, or to
publicly criticize the board.129 As a result, "there is no set of standards" for
non-profit boards.130 Most directors do not even know what they are
supposed to do.131
Apart from suits by the state for illegal acts, the only possible
challengers to the dominance of the NPO board are the organization's
executives, especially the CEO.132 As in the business corporation, the
officers can legitimately claim to know more than the outside directors.133
And as in the business corporation, the full-time executives of non-profits
are much more affected by the organization's policies than are the part-time,
outside directors, so the executives are more likely to fight for the policies

80067/SC_Publication_Adjusting_to_Shareholder_Activism.pdf (noting successful shareholder
proposals on dismantling classified boards, takeover projections, say-on-pay votes, proxy access, and
other governance measures).
127
See Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism
in Corporate Governance 29 (The Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law Pub. Law
and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 225, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.c
om/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2324151 ("[I]nformation provided [to] the market place . . . by
offensive shareholder activism is in general perceived to be valuable to shareholders and is being
integrated into corporate strategy in a statistically significant way.").
128
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Tackling the Managerial Power
Problem, PATHWAYS, Summer 2010, at 10 ("Executives have less power over directors when
shareholders are larger or more sophisticated and thus can more easily exert influence over the
board.").
129
See TROPMAN & HARVEY, supra note 38, at 31 ("[Non-profit boards] are worse [than
for-profit boards] because, in effect, they have no oversight.").
130
Id. at 32 (estimating there could be 28 million board members managing a trillion dollars
while operating with no practical or ethical guidance).
131
Id.; see supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text; see also CHAIT ET AL., supra note 30,
at 14 (offering an unambiguous official job description as the best solution for board members who
do not know what their job is).
132
See TROPMAN & HARVEY, supra note 38, at 31-32 (remarking that boards are insulated
from accountability and responsibility and that no board members are ever fired).
133
See CHAIT ET AL., supra note 30, at 180 (calling for board members to bridge the
knowledge gap by working diligently as a group and answering complex and important questions).
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they favor.134 The outside directors are more likely to consider a fight not
worth the effort and cave in to the executives.135
Such a result is particularly likely when the directors are not sure what
the organization's goals are.136 Shareholder primacists (but not director
primacists) consider the goal of the for-profit corporation to be maximizing
shareholder value. Directors of NPOs, however, are uncertain of their
goals.137 The CEO will pursue an agenda of her choosing and present the
board with information of her choosing about the organization's
performance.138 There are no shareholders to contest this agenda.139 Even a
director who prefers a different agenda will hesitate to undertake a lonely
battle against the better informed CEO.140 A director who is uncertain about
what the NPO's goals should be and knows nothing more about its
performance than what the CEO deigns to divulge is unlikely even to ask
pointed questions, much less to challenge the CEO.141
Critics of shareholder primacy in for-profit corporate governance
object to the use of shareholder value as the ultimate corporate goal.142 They
argue for letting the board pursue a variety of goals, including "mak[ing]
commitments that attract the loyalty of customers and employees" and
"sacrific[ing] at least some profits to allow the company to act in an ethical
and socially responsible fashion."143
However lofty these goals may sound, the inevitable result of
fragmenting the organization's goals is to shift power from the board to the

134
Leduc & Block, supra note 78, at 67 (emphasizing that the tension between executives
and board members arises because while the executives are responsible for the daily operations and
meeting the goals of the organization, they have to share the power in determining what those goals
are with board members).
135
See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principles: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 499-501 (1996)
(discussing the differences between non-profit and for-profit boards).
136
See GOVERNANCE OF NPOS, supra note 50, at 151; supra Part II.
137
See GOVERNANCE OF NPOS, supra note 50, at 151; supra Part II.
138
See supra Part II.
139
Nolo, Running Your Nonprofit Corporation, BPLANS.COM, http://articles.bplans.com
/small-business-legal-issues/running-your-nonprofit-corporation/192 (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
140
See Lumen N. Mulligan, What's Good for the Goose is not Good for the Gander:
Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981, 1987-88 (2007) (discussing
factors that affect non-profit board governance).
141
See id.
142
See Gordon Pearson, The Truth About Shareholder Primacy, GUARDIAN (Apr. 27,
2012), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/short-termism-shareholder-long-termleadership/print.
143
STOUT, supra note 20, at 9. Not all director primacists share this view. See Bainbridge,
supra note 22, at 563-64 (supporting shareholder wealth maximization as the proper corporate goal).
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CEO.144 It is hard enough for part-time directors to determine how
effectively management is maximizing shareholder value.145 When several
diverse, vague, and immeasurable goals, like those just listed, are thrown
into the equation, it becomes much more difficult for directors to gauge how
well management is performing.146 As Michael Jensen puts it, "[a]ny
organization must have a single-valued objective as a precursor to purposeful
or rational behavior."147
As the highest authority in an NPO, its board has not only the power,
but also the obligation to determine the organization's goals;148 it would be a
breach of its duties to delegate this function to anyone else.149 However,
most NPO boards fail to set goals or even to play a meaningful role in the
entity's governance.150 NPO boards do not use their freedom from
accountability to shareholders (or anyone else) to create and implement wise,
far-sighted plans as director primacy theory would predict.151 Rather, that
freedom has left them drifting aimlessly while the crucial decisions are made
by the NPO's officers, who, in theory, should merely execute the strategy
instituted by the board.152
Is this for the best? Despite its legal status as the ultimate authority in
the organization, perhaps the board is not well positioned to gather
information, map out options, and identify the ideal strategy for the NPO.153
A wise board might instead defer to the more knowledgeable executives but
carefully scrutinize plans drafted by the executives and revise them where
appropriate; monitor the officers' implementation of the plan ultimately
chosen;154 and intervene if the executives were ineffective, inefficient,

144

See Dent, supra note 18, at 43 (describing pressures by management that fractured boards

face).

145
See Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 533, 546-48 (2006) (defining agency costs).
146
See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
147
Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate
Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 237 (2002).
148
See generally Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit
Corporate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors' Fiduciary Duties, 14 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 327 (2012) (examining the current state of non-profit directors' fiduciary duties).
149
See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
150
See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
151
See Dent, supra note 20, at 104-05.
152
Francie Ostrower & Melissa M. Stone, Governance: Research Trends, Gaps, and Future
Prospects, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 612, 617 (Walter W. Powell &
Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006).
153
Id. at 619 (discussing the different perceptions that board members have about their
roles).
154
See id. at 621.
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moving the NPO in the wrong direction, or placing their own interests above
those of the organization.155
Unfortunately, experience shows that the freedom of NPOs from
shareholders rarely leads to such effective governance.156 Like any insular
group, an executive management team tends to develop tunnel vision and to
ward off anyone who disputes their vision.157 Managements can (and do)158
present the board only with information that supports management's strategy,
withholding any information that might suggest any alternative approach.159
The full-time, experienced managers are experts; by comparison, the
directors who meet five times per year are rank amateurs.160 Given this
imbalance of information and expertise, it takes great determination and
effort for any outsider to mount a serious challenge to the executives.161 In
both non-profit and for-profit corporations the outside directors have little to
gain or lose from the corporation's performance, so their personal interest
alone will not induce them to undertake a battle with management.162
In the business corporation, large shareholders have enough at stake to
motivate them if they believe that management's policies seriously impair the
value of their stock.163 They then put pressure on the board to change those
policies.164 In doing so, shareholders face many obstacles, but in many cases
they can exert some influence.165 In non-profits, however, there are no
shareholders (or any other constituency) that can put such pressure on the
board, which therefore usually takes the path of least resistance by deferring
to the executives.166 To the extent that NPO directors assert themselves at
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all, it is primarily to squabble with each other rather than to provide
oversight of management.167
Some experts on non-profit boards acknowledge that this difference
explains why they perform worse than for-profit boards: "They are worse
because, in effect, they have no oversight. They are, in effect, like public
servants. Insulated as both groups are from the 'political' process, they are
insulated, as well, from accountability and responsibility. No one 'fires' a
nonprofit director (board member)."168 This results in diversion of the NPO
from its supposed goals. "The absence of owners . . . means that managers
are largely free of outside discipline, which creates the risk of managerialism
(or, in economic terms, agency costs)."169 With no discipline and no personal
stake in the NPO’s performance, the directors tend to abdicate to the
insiders. "In the case of nonprofits, some observers believe that the absence
of shareholders emphasizes an inappropriate reversal of the power
relationship between the board and the officers."170
The same phenomenon has been noted in Europe: "The main
difference from [for-profit] corporate boards in terms of control is that
adequate control is often underdeveloped. This is obvious for nonprofit
organizations without members who could hold the board accountable. State
supervisory bodies . . . cannot replace the control wielded by
shareholders."171 I have found no one who claims that the absence of
shareholders, on balance, results in better governance of NPOs than of forprofits.
One critique of shareholder primacy in for-profit corporations is that,
if shareholders dominate, they may exploit other corporate constituents,
especially employees.172 In particular, critics charge that shareholders may
make "opportunistic attempts to increase 'shareholder value' by changing the
corporate rules in the middle of the game."173 The shareholders' insistence on
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short-term profits also allegedly results in conduct that alienates customers.174
On the other side, advocates of shareholder primacy claim that freeing
boards from shareholder control results not in the directors' governing as
wise Solons, but in CEO domination, and does not even generate benefits for
employees.175
The experience of NPOs clearly confirms that, in the absence of board
accountability to shareholders, control gravitates away from the board and to
the executives, especially the CEO.176 Moreover, amid all the critiques of
NPO boards there are no claims that this state of affairs leads to better
treatment of employees (or any other constituency) in NPOs than in forprofits.177 Again, the evidence refutes director primacy theory; the treatment
of employees and other constituencies is no silver lining to the cloud of
dysfunctional NPO boards.178
V. CONCLUSION
The governance of business corporations is debated between
advocates of shareholder primacy, who want corporate boards to be
accountable to shareholders, and supporters of director primacy, who want
directors to be relatively free of shareholder control so that they can act as
"Platonic guardians."179
This debate is hardly new. Eighty years ago Merrick Dodd decried
"the view that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making
profits for their stockholders."180 Adolph Berle countered that to abandon
this principle would result in corporate control being "simply handed over,
weakly, to the present administrators with a pious wish that something nice
will come out of it all. . . . This is an invitation not to law or orderly
government, but to a process of economic civil war."181
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Non-profit corporations have no shareholders; their boards of directors
are mostly self-perpetuating, an ideal condition for "Platonic guardians."182
Accordingly, NPO boards offer an opportunity to test the competing claims
of shareholder primacy and director primacy.183 The experience of NPO
boards confirms shareholder primacy theory and belies director primacy
claims.184 Free of accountability to shareholders, NPO boards do not provide
intelligent, prudent, cooperative, and far-sighted governance.185 Instead, they
are lax, uninformed, conflict-ridden, and confused about institutional
goals.186 Rather than overseeing their organizations, as is their legal duty,
they tend to defer to the control of the executives, especially the CEO.187 All
of this conforms to what shareholder primacists would predict.188 It is not
quite the "economic civil war" predicted long ago by Adolph Berle, but it is
often chaos and confusion.189
The director primacists' critique of shareholder power has a political
counterpart in the critiques of democracy that have been and still are often
voiced from both the left and the right.190 In these critiques the public is
presented as ill-informed and fragmented into warring interest groups.191
Therefore, prudent government can be achieved only by vesting control in a
self-perpetuating elite (either of some sort of aristocracy or of Marxist
politburo) that is insulated from hoi polloi.192 Of course, the critiques of
shareholder and political democracy both have some validity; shareholders
and the public are not always well-informed, dispassionate, and fair.193
However, self-perpetuating elites never govern in the interest of their
supposed constituents, and their lack of accountability typically results in
their not even being very efficient in achieving whatever goals they do
pursue.194 It is true of shareholder democracy, as Winston Churchill said of
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political democracy, that it "is the worst form of Government except all those
other forms that have been tried from time to time."195
The example of NPO governance does not tell us exactly how to
implement shareholder primacy in for-profit corporations. It does show,
however, that freeing directors from shareholder control leads not to optimal
governance, but to dysfunction.196
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